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ABSTRACT
Americans now work 50 percent more than do the Germans, French, and Italians. This was not the
case in the early 1970s when the Western Europeans worked more than Americans. In this paper,
I examine the role of taxes in accounting for the differences in labor supply across time and across
countries, in particular, the effect of the marginal tax rate on labor income. The population of
countries considered is that of the G-7 countries, which are the major advanced industrial countries.
The surprising finding is that this marginal tax rate accounts for the predominance of the differences
at points in time and the large change in relative labor supply over time with the exception of the
Italian labor supply in the early 1970s. This finding has important implications for policy, in
particular for making social security programs solvent.
Edward C. Prescott
Research Department





Americans, that is, residents of the United States, now work much more than do 
Europeans.  Using labor market statistics from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), I find that Americans on a per person aged 15-64 basis work in 
the market sector 50 percent more than do the French.  This was not always the case.  In the 
early 1970s, Americans allocated less time to the market than did the French.  The 
comparisons between Americans and Germans or Italians are the same.  Why are there such 
large differences in labor supply across these countries? Why did the relative labor supplies 
change so much over time?  In this lecture, I determine the importance of tax rates in 
accounting for these differences in labor supply for the major advanced industrial countries 
and find that tax rates alone account for most of these differences in labor supply. 
This finding has important implications for policy in particular for financing social 
security retirement programs in Europe.  On the pessimistic side, one implication is that 
increasing tax rates will not solve the problem of these under funded plans, because 
increasing tax rates will not increase revenue.  On the positive side, the system can be 
reformed in a way that makes the young better off while honoring promises to the old.  This 
can be accomplished by modifying the tax system so that when an individual works more and 
produces more output, the individual gets to consume a larger fraction of this increase output.   
The major advanced industrial countries, which used to be called the G-7 countries, are 
the European countries France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, plus Canada, 
Japan, and the United States. For these countries comparable and sufficiently good statistics 
are available to carry out this investigation.  The data sources are the United Nations system 
of national accounts (SNA) statistics and the OECD labor market statistics and purchasing  2
power GDP numbers.
1 The periods considered are 1970–74 and 1993–96.  The later period 
was chosen because it is the most recent period prior to the U.S. telecommunications/dot-
com boom of the late 1990s, a period when the relative size of unmeasured output was 
probably significantly larger than normal and there may have been associated problems with 
the market hours statistics.  The early period was selected because it is the earliest one for 
which sufficiently good data are available to carry out the analysis.  The relative numbers 
subsequent to 2000 are pretty much the same as they were in the pre technology boom period 
1993-96. 
I emphasize that my labor supply measure is hours worked per person 15-64 in the taxed 
market sector.  The two principal margins of work effort are hours actually worked by 
employees and the fraction of the working age population that work.  Paid vacations, sick 
leave, and holidays are hours of non working time.  The time of someone working in the 
underground economy or in the home sector is not counted.  Other things equal, a country 
with more weeks of vacations and more holidays will have a lower labor supply in the sense 
that I am using the term.  I focus only on that part of working time that the resulting labor 
income is taxed.  
                                                   
1 For Italy the gross domestic product (GDP) is reduced by 20 percent because Italy’s GDP statistics include 
estimates of the output of the underground untaxed economy.  My theory is concerned with the above-ground 
taxed economy, and I want GDP for this sector.  This is why I do not follow Maddison (1995, pp. 241–50) and 
increase the OECD labor supply numbers by 16.0 percent in the 1970–74 period and 17.6 percent in the 1993–
96 period.  3
 
Table 1 
GDP, Labor Supply, and Productivity 
 Major Advanced Countries: 1993–96 
 
Country GDP
a per person 
15-64;  U.S.=100 
Hours per person 
15-64; U.S.=100 
GDP per hour 
U.S.=100 
    
Germany  74 75 99 
France 74  68  110 
Italy  57 64 90 
Canada  79 88 89 
United  Kingdom  67 88 76 
Japan  78 104 74 
United  States  100 100 100 
a OECD purchasing power parity GDP numbers 
 
Table 1 reports the G-7 countries’ GDP, labor supply, and productivity statistics for the 
1993–96 period relative to the United States.  Also reported are GDP per person aged 15-64 
and labor productivities also relative to the United States. The important observation is that 
labor supply is much higher in Japan and the United States than it is in Germany, France, and 
Italy.  Canada and the United Kingdom are in the intermediate range.  Another observation is 
that U.S. per capita output is about 40 percent higher than in the European countries with 
most of the differences in output accounted for by differences in hours worked per person 
and not by differences in productivity, that is, in output per hour. Indeed, the OECD statistics 
indicate that French productivity is 10 percent higher than it is in the United States.  In Japan,  4
the per capita output difference is accounted for by lower productivity and not by lower labor 
supply. 
Table 2 
Labor Supply, Productivity, and GDP 
 Major Advanced Countries: 1970–74 
 
Country GDP
a per person 
 15-64; U.S.=100 
Hours per person 
15-64; U.S.=100 
GDP per hour 
U.S.=100 
 
    
Germany 75  105  72 
France 77  105  74 
Italy 53  82  65 
Canada 86  94  91 
United Kingdom  68  110  62 
Japan 62  127  49 
United States  100  100  100 
a OECD purchasing power parity GDP numbers 
 
Table 2 shows a very different picture in the 1970–74 period. The difference is not in per 
capita GDP. Then, European per capita GDP was about 70 percent of the U.S. level, as it was 
in 1993–96 and is today.  However, the reason for the lower output in Europe was not fewer 
market hours, as was the case in the 1993–96 period, but rather lower output per hour.  In 
1970–74, Europeans worked more than Americans. The exception is Italy.  Some change 
resulted in these changes in labor supply.   5
2. Theory Used 
  The theory used is standard. It is the theory used in quantitative studies of business 
cycles (Cooley (1995)), of depressions (Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott 
(2002)), of public finance issues (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King 
(1993)), and of the stock market (McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2003) and Boldrin, 
Christiano, and Fisher (2001)).  In focusing on labor supply, I am following Lucas and 
Rapping (1969), Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott (1982), Hansen (1985), and Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987). 
This theory has a stand-in household that faces a labor-leisure decision and a 
consumption-savings decision.  The preferences of this stand-in household are ordered by 







t h c E α β . 
Variable c denotes consumption, and h denotes hours of labor supplied to the market sector 
per person per week.  The discount factor 0 < β  < 1 specifies the degree of patience, with a 
higher value being more patient. The parameter α > 0 specifies the value of nonmarket 
productive time to the household.  Given that on a per person basis a household has about 
100 hours of productive time a week, nonmarket productive time is 100 – h hours per week 
per working-age person in the household.  Following the tradition in macroeconomics, this 
nonmarket productive time will be referred to as leisure even though much of it is time 
allocated to working in the nonmarket sector, and in the underground market sector. The 
important thing for this analysis is that any production using this time is not taxed. 
  In the model economy used, the household owns the capital and rents it to the firm. 
This is an assumption of convenience because the findings are identical if the firm owns the  6
capital and the household owns the firm, or if the firm is partially debt financed. The law of 
motion governing the capital stock is 
(2)     t t t x k k + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ . 
  The theory also has a stand-in firm with a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
(3)    
θ θ − ≤ + + =
1
t t it t t t t h k A g x c y . 
Here y denotes output, c consumption, x investment, g pure public consumption, and k the 
capital stock. The capital cost share parameter is 0 < θ  < 1, and the total factor productivity 
parameter of country i at date t is it A .  I will not specify the process on  } { it A  because it plays 
no role in the inference being drawn, except to implicitly restrict the process governing its 
evolution in such a way that results in the existence of a competitive equilibrium. 
  The household’s date t budget constraint is  
(4)  (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ct xt ht t k t t t t cxw h r k k T + τ ++ τ =− τ +− τ − δ + δ+ , 
where  t w  is the real wage rate,  t r the rental price of capital,  c τ  the consumption tax rate,  x τ  
the tax investment tax,  h τ  the marginal labor tax rate,  k τ  the capital income tax rate, and  t T  
transfers.  I emphasize that the marginal and average labor income taxes will be very 
different. 
  All taxes revenue except for that used to finance the pure public consumption are 
given back to the households either as transfer payments or in kind.  These transfers are lump 
sum being independent of a household income. Most public expenditures are substitutes for 
private consumption in the G-7 countries.  Here I will assume that they substitute on a one-
to-one basis for private consumption with the exception of military expenditures.  The goods 
and services in question are mostly publicly provided education, health care, protection  7
services, and even judiciary services. My estimate of pure government consumption g is two 
times military’s share of employment times GDP.  
  In having only one consumption good, I am following Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992). Rogerson (2003) has found that this one consumption good abstraction is not a good 
one for studying aggregate labor supply in the Scandinavian countries.  One possible reason 
for this is that some publicly provided goods, such as child care for working parents, must be 
treated as a separate good. Often the receipt of this good is contingent on working, and this 
must be taken into account in the household’s constraint set. However, the one consumption 
good abstraction used in this study is a reasonable one for the set of countries considered in 
this study. 
  This is a far simpler tax system than the one employed in any of the G-7 countries.  
Introducing accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits would affect the price of the 
investment good relative to the consumption good, but would not alter the inference drawn in 
this lecture.  Similarly, introducing a corporate sector, with dividends not taxed, as is 
generally the case in Europe, or taxed as they are in the United Sates as ordinary income, 
would not alter any conclusion significantly.  For further details on these issues, see 
McGrattan and Prescott (2002). What is important is the price of consumption relative to 
leisure, and it is determined by the consumption tax rate c τ  and the labor income tax rate h τ . 
  The most important parameter that will enter the equilibrium relation that I use to 
predict the consequence of the tax system is the preference parameterα , which measures the 
value of leisure relative to consumption.  The capital cost share parameter θ  also enters the 
relation, but is of less importance.  8
Key equilibrium relation 
  The labor and consumption tax rates can be combined into a single tax rateτ , which I 
call the effective marginal tax rate on labor income.  It is the fraction of additional labor 
income that is taken in the form of taxes holding investment, or equivalently savings, fixed.  












Two first-order conditions are used to construct the key equilibrium relation that is 
used to predict labor supply.  The first is that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure 
and consumption is equal to their price ratio; that is, 











The second is the profit-maximizing condition that the wage equals the marginal product of 
labor; that is, 
(7)   h y h k w / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( θ θ
θ θ − = − =
− . 




















The subscript i denotes the country, and the subscript t denotes the date. 
  This equilibrium relation clearly separates the intertemporal and intratemporal factors 
affecting labor supply.  The intratemporal factor is captured by  τ − 1 , which distorts the 
relative prices of consumption and leisure at a point in time.  The c/y term captures 
intertemporal factors. If, for example, the effective tax rate on labor income is expected to be 
higher in the future, people will choose a lower current value for c/y, and current labor supply  9
will be higher.  The same is true if the current capital stock is low relative to its balanced 
growth path level.  More formally, equilibrium c/y is a function of the predictive probability 
distribution of future tax rates and productivities and the current capital stock.  Knowing the 
value of this function and the current effective tax rate on labor income suffices for 
predicting current labor income.    
  In focusing on the role of taxes in determining aggregate labor supply, I am not 
implying that other factors are unimportant.  Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Chari, Kehoe, and 
McGrattan (2003), using the discipline employed here, present strong evidence that other 
factors were important in accounting for the low labor supply in the United States in the 
1930s.  Similarly, Cole and Ohanian (2002) present evidence that the low labor supply in the 
United Kingdom in the interwar period was due to other factors, and Fisher and Hornstein 
(2002) find that labor market distortions that increased the real wage significantly above the 
competitive level were the major factor in accounting for the huge decline in German output 
in the 1928–32 period.  In focusing on the role of marginal tax rates on labor income, I want 
to determine what role, if any, they play in accounting for the huge differences in labor 
supplies across this relatively homogenous set of market economies at a point in time and in 
accounting for large changes over time in labor supplies across these countries.
2 
  The theory abstracts from many features of reality that affect labor supply, in 
particular, whether a married household has one or two wage earners.  This issue is discussed 
briefly in the context of the change in the U.S. labor supply in conjunction with the change in 
the nature of the income tax schedule that occurred as a result of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform 
Act.   
                                                   
2 Three recent studies that address issues related to the ones considered in this lecture are Davis and Henrekson 
(2003), Olovsson (2003), and Nickell (2003).  10
3. Estimating Tax Rates 
  The theory has the household paying the taxes.  Consequently, it is necessary to 
adjust the national income accounts to be consistent with this theoretical framework.  The 
adjustment, which is a major one, is to treat indirect taxes less subsidies as net taxes on final 
product.  This means removing net indirect taxes as a cost component of GDP and reducing 
final product components.  
In using national accounts (SNA) data to estimate tax rates and making the distinction 
between prices facing producers and consumers, I am following Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 
(1994).  There are some important differences in the approach with my estimated tax rates 
being in greater part model economy dependent. In what follows the capital letters are SNA 
statistics. I assumed that two-thirds of these indirect taxes net of subsidies fall directly on 
private consumption expenditures and that the remaining one-third is distributed evenly over 
private consumption and private investment.  Thus, net indirect taxes on consumption,  , c IT  
are 
(9)     IT
I C
C
ITc ] 3 / 1 3 / 2 [
+
+ = , 
where C  is SNA private consumption expenditures, I is SNA private investment, and IT is 
net indirect taxes. 
  The model economy’s consumption c and output y are  
(10)   mil c cCGG I T =+− −  and  IT GDP y − = . 
The motivation for this assignment of indirect taxes is that most indirect taxes fall on 
consumption whether these taxes are a value-added tax, a sales tax, an excise tax, or a 
property tax.  Some taxes, such as fuel taxes on diesel fuel used by trucks that transport  11
goods, property taxes on office buildings, and sales taxes on equipment purchases by 
businesses, fall on all forms of product.  My estimate of the consumption tax rate is 








  There are two taxes on labor income, the income tax with marginal rate  inc τ and the 
social security tax with marginal rate ss τ .  My estimate of the social security tax rate is simply 
(12)    
Social Security Taxes







The denominator is labor income if labor is paid its marginal product. 
In some countries, some social security taxes are savings because retirement benefits 
increase with income.  But, this is a marginal tax rate.  If someone works an additional year, 
typically there are no additional benefits.  In the United States the marginal savings factor is 
tiny.  First, using a 4 percent discount rate and a 2 percent growth rate in the real wage, 
which are numbers for the U.S. economy in the twentieth century  (McGrattan and Prescott 
(2003)), the present value of benefits is only one-quarter of the present value of 
contributions. Second, the social security payment benefit scheme is highly progressive. 
Third, benefits to married couples typically go up little if both work rather than if only one 
works. Fourth, beginning in the early 1990s, a significant part of social security benefits is 
subject to income taxes for many people.  Fifth, for many older workers their current-year 
taxable labor income has little or no consequences for the retirement benefits they receive.    
Social security taxes are listed as an expenditure of the household sector in the SNA. 
They include taxes used to finance health care and unemployment payments, and not just 
taxes used to finance retirement programs.  These taxes are typically proportional taxes on 
labor income, and they are treated as such in this analysis.  In the SNA these taxes are treated  12
as part of compensation, as theory says they should be, when they are paid by the employer, 
which is typically the case. 
 The average, not marginal, income tax rate is 







Direct taxes are those paid by households and do not include corporate income taxes. Like 
social security taxes, they are listed as an expenditure of the household sector in the SNA. 
My estimate of the marginal labor income tax rate is 
(14)     inc ss h τ τ τ 6 . 1 + = . 
The most problematic number in my analysis is the 1.6 factor that reflects the fact that the 
marginal income tax rates are higher than the average tax rates.  The 1.6 number was selected 
because it results in the marginal income tax rate obtained using the Feenberg and Coutts 
(1993) methodology for the United States in both the 1970–74 and 1993–96 periods.  
Feenberg and Coutts’ methodology uses a representative sample of tax records to compute 
the marginal tax rate on labor income by determining how much tax revenue increases if 
every household’s labor income is changed by 1 percent. The total change in tax receipts 
divided by the total change in labor income is the Feenberg-Coutts estimate of the marginal 
income tax rate on labor income.  I will return to this point later.   
4. Predicted and Actual Labor Supplies 
  There are two parameters that must be specified before formula (8) can be used to 
predict labor supply.  The first parameter is the capital share parameter θ  in the production 
function.  In all the countries, in both periods this number is close to the average of 0.3224, 
so θ  is set equal to this value for all countries in both periods.  The second parameter is the  13
utility of leisure parameterα .  This parameter was chosen so that overall the average labor 
supply of the non-outlier observations, of which there are two, are close to actual.  The value 
chosen is 1.54.   
Table 3 reports the actual and predicted labor supplies for the G-7 countries in the 1993–
96 period.  The predicted values are surprisingly close to the actual values with the average 
difference being only 1.14  hours per week.  I say that this number is surprisingly small 
because this analysis abstracts from labor market policies and demographics which have 
consequences for aggregate labor supply and because there are significant errors in 
measuring the labor input. 
Table 3 
G-7 Countries’ Predicted and Actual Labor Supply: 1993–96 
Country  Tax rate τ   c/y   Hours per person 15-64 per week 
     Actual Predicted 
       
Germany 0.59  0.74  19.3  19.5 
France 0.59  0.74  17.5  19.5 
Italy 0.64  0.69  16.5  18.8 
Canada 0.52  0.77  22.9  21.3 
United Kingdom  0.44  0.83  22.8  22.8 
Japan 0.37  0.68  27.0  29.0 
United States  0.40  0.81  25.9  24.6 
 
The important observation is that the low labor supplies in Germany, France, and Italy 
are due to high tax rates.  In these countries if someone works more and produces 100  14
additional euros of output, that individual gets to consume only 40 euros of additional 
consumption and pays directly or indirectly 60 euros in taxes. 
Table 4 reports the predicted and actual values for the 1970–74 period.  For Italy it is 
clear that some factor other than taxes depressed labor supply in the early 1970s.  This period 
was one of political instability in Italy, and quite possibly cartelization policies reduced 
equilibrium labor supply as in the Cole and Ohanian (2002) model of the U.S. economy in 
the 1935–39 period.  The overly high prediction for labor supply for Japan in the 1970–74 
period may in significant part be the result of my utility function having too little curvature 
with respect to leisure and, as a result, the theory overpredicts when the effective tax rate on 
labor income is low.  Another possible reason for the overprediction may be a measurement 
error.  The 1970–74 Japanese labor supply statistics are based on establishment surveys only 
because at that time household surveys were not conducted.  In Japan the household survey 
gives a much bigger estimate of hours worked in the period when both household- and 
establishment-based estimates are available.  In the other countries household surveys are 
used to estimate labor supply.  15
Table 4 
G-7 Countries’ Predicted and Actual Labor Supply: 1970–74 
Country  Tax rate τ   c/y  Hours per person per week 
     Actual Predicted 
        
Germany 0.52  0.66  24.6  24.6 
France 0.49  0.66  24.4  25.4 
Italy 0.41  0.66  19.2  28.3 
Canada 0.44  0.72  22.2  25.6 
United 
Kingdom 
0.45 0.77  25.9  24.0 
Japan 0.25  0.60  29.8  35.8 
United States  0.40  0.74  23.5  26.4 
 
  An important observation is that when European and U.S. tax rates were comparable, 
European and U.S. labor supplies were comparable.  At the aggregate level, where 
idiosyncratic factors are averaged out, people are remarkably similar across countries. This is 
true not only for the G-7 countries, but as shown by Bergoeing et al. (2002) for Chile and 
Mexico and by Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) for Argentina as well. Apparently, 
idiosyncratic preference differences average out and result in the stand-in household having 
almost identical preferences across countries. 
I find it surprising that virtually all the large differences in the U.S. labor supply and 
those of Germany and France are due to differences in tax systems.  I expected institutional 
constraints on the operation of labor markets and the nature of the unemployment benefit  16
system to be of major importance. They do appear to be important in Italy in the 1970–74 
period.   
5. Changes in U.S. Labor Supply 
  An interesting feature of the data is that U.S. labor supply increased by 10 percent 
between 1970–74 and 1993–96, yet the marginal tax rate on labor remained at 0.40.  The fact 
that all the increase in labor supply was by married women and not by males or by single 
females suggests that the appropriate marginal tax rate may have fallen with the flattening of 
the income tax rate schedule associated with the tax reforms of the 1980s, in particular, the 
1986 tax reform (McGrattan and Rogerson (1998)). The U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(1972, 1994) lists the number of married households’ tax returns by adjusted gross income 
categories as well as reports the income tax schedule.  These data show that the marginal tax 
rate for large changes in income such as those that would occur from moving between a one-
earner household to a two-earner household was significantly higher in 1972 than it was in 
1994. 
  Households switching between having one and two wage earners probably faced 
lower marginal tax rates in the 1993–96 period than in the 1970–74 period, even though the 
Feenberg-Coutts marginal income tax rates are the same.  This possibility is illustrated by the 
following example of a two-person household.  In the early period, if the working individual 
in the household increases hours worked by a small amount, the marginal income tax on the 
additional labor income is 20 percent, which is the Feenberg-Coutts estimate for that period.  
However, if the household doubles its labor supply by switching from a one-earner to a two-
earner household, the marginal income tax rate on the additional labor income is 40 percent 
for this illustrative numerical example.    17
Illustrative Example 
Before Tax Reform 
Earners Earnings  Taxes Average  “Marginal” 
1 10 1.3  13.0%  20% 
2 20 5.3  26.5  40% 
 
After Tax Reform 
Earners Earnings  Taxes Average  “Marginal” 
1 10 1.5  10.0%  20% 
2 20 2.6  13.0%  20% 
 
 
  The situation is very different in 1993–96, when the household has two earners.  
Small changes in labor supply in this case are still subject to a 20 percent tax rate as in the 
1970–74 period, which is what the Feenberg-Coutts method finds for that period.  However, 
the marginal income tax on the labor income associated with switching between a one-earner 
and a two-earner household is only 20 percent, not 40 percent as it was in the 1970–74 
period.  
  This issue of the effect of the nature of the income tax schedule on labor supply for 
households with two potential wage earners warrants more attention.  Feldstein (1995) 
examines the consequences of the 1986 Tax Reform Act using a Treasury Department panel 
of more than 4,000 tax forms and finds micro evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  It is 
further supported in the Feldstein and Feenberg (1993) analysis of the Clinton Tax Plan.   
Some macro evidence is provided by what happened subsequent to the 1998 Spanish 
tax reform that flattened the Spanish income tax schedule in much the same way that the 
1986 U.S. tax reform flattened the U.S. tax schedule.  Subsequently, Spanish labor supply 
increased by 12 percent and tax revenue by a few percent. If the change in the factor that  18
converts the average income tax rate to a marginal tax rate were the same in the United States 
and Spain and sufficiently large to increase U.S. labor supply by 10 percent, then the 
predicted increase in Spanish labor supply would be the observed 12 percent. More research 
is needed to determine whether the hypothesis that the flattening of the tax schedule is the 
principal reason for the large increases in labor supply in both the United States and Spain 
subsequent to their tax reforms. 
The welfare gains from reducing the effective marginal tax rate on labor income in 
the high tax rate countries are large.  If France were to reduce its effective tax rate on labor 
income from 60 percent to the U.S. 40 percent rate, the welfare of the French people would 
increase by 19 percent in terms of lifetime consumption equivalents. This is a large number 
for a welfare gain.  This estimate of the welfare gain takes into consideration the reduction in 
leisure associated with the change in the tax system and the cost of accumulating capital 
associated with the higher balanced growth path. The reduction in leisure is from 81.2 hours 
a week to 75.8 hours, which is a 6.6 percent decline in leisure. I was surprised to find that 
this large tax rate decrease did not lower tax revenues.
3 
The welfare gains if the United States reduced its marginal tax rate on labor income 
are smaller.  If the tax rate is reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent, the gains in terms of 
lifetime consumption equivalents are 7 percent.   
                                                   
3 Mendoza and Tesar (2002) also find that revenue is maximized with a tax rate slightly above 50 percent.  19
6. Implications of Findings: U.S. Social Security Reform 
If labor supply is fixed, a pay-as-you-go social security system cannot be converted to 
a fully funded system in a way that makes every generation better off.  If, however, the labor 
supply is not fixed, the transition can be made in a way that makes every generation better 
off. The only issue is how long the transition will take.  Using the elasticity of labor supply 
number obtained in the first part of this lecture, I now will explore this issue of how long 
such a transition will take.   
The model economy is modified is two respects.  First, I follow Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987) and use the overlapping generational structure rather than the infinitely 
lived family structure employed in Section 1.
4  In the modified structure, the key relation 
used to forecast labor supply continues to hold. Second, the technology assumed has perfect 
substitution between capital and labor. The productivity of labor grows at the rate of 2 
percent a year, which implies that the real wage will grow at 2 percent a year as it has on 
average throughout the twentieth century.  The productivity of capital is constant and is such 
that the after-tax return is 4 percent. 
Alternatively, I could have assumed that capital income tax rates, which are not 
formally modeled, are adjusted so as to maintain a 4 percent return on capital if the 
capital/output ratio changes as a result of the reform.  This 4 percent return is the after-tax 
real return that has prevailed in the United States in the 1880–2002 period (McGrattan and 
Prescott (2003)). Having some dynastic families would also work in the direction of keeping 
the interest rate constant. 
                                                   
4 See the July 1999 issue of the Review of Economic Dynamics, which is devoted entirely to studies of the U.S. 
social security system. These studies are much richer in detail than this one. But they do not use the utility 
function used in this study, and as a result my results are different. Conesa and Garriga (2003) address the status 
quo problem in social security reform.  20
I assume that an equal number of people begin their working career every year at 22, 
they work for 41 years, and then they live 19 additional years. The implies they retire at 63 
which is the average retirement age. They receive social security benefits equal to 0.319 of 
the wage that prevailed when they are 66 beginning when they are 67 and continuing for 14 
additional years.  In fact, for the U.S. system, the wage base is the one that prevailed when an 
individual is 60 years old, so the replacement rate is approximately 36 percent.  The effective 
tax rate on labor income is 40 percent, as it is in the United States, with 10 percent of this 
being social security retirement tax.  The reason that 10 percent is used rather than the U.S. 
12.4 percent social security tax rate is that some U.S. social security taxes are used to provide 
disability and survivors’ insurance in the United States. 
The assumption of no population growth is not realistic and introduces two errors.  
These errors, however, are of opposite sign and offsetting, so this illustrative example is still 
valid for building good quantitative economic intuition.  The first error is that the relative 
number of people with social security claims is smaller if population growth is positive.  This 
reduces the initial implicit liabilities relative to GDP of the pay-as-you-go system.  The 
second error is that with a growing population the pay-as-you-go system will have higher 
levels of benefit payments associated with a given social security retirement tax. This 
increases the implicit liabilities of the current system. The pay-as-you-go system that I 
consider has the property that social security benefits paid are equal to social security taxes 
collected. 
The model economy’s time period is a year. The steady state of a pay-as-you-go 
system and a fully funded system are reported in Table 5.  With the fully funded system, 
steady-state labor supply is 11 percent higher, consumption 17 percent higher, and welfare in  21
lifetime consumption equivalents 9 percent higher.  The problem with just switching from the 
current pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded system is that the initial old would suffer.  
The following reform makes all better off.  There are still better reforms than this one, in 
particular, plans that have tax rates that depend upon age at the time of reform. 
 
Table 5 
Steady States for Two Social Security Systems 
 
Variable  Pay-As-You-Go System  Fully Funded System 
   
Net Output   100  123 
Capital/Net Output Ratio  2.77  4.91 
Labor Supply  100  111 
Consumption per Person  100  117 
Social Security Liabilities 
Relative to Net Output 
4.62 0.00 
Welfare in Lifetime 
Consumption Equivalents 
100 109 
Effective Labor Tax Rate  40.00%  27.05% 
 
Proposed Reform 
  People are given the option to continue with the current system or to shift to a new 
system.  With the new system, 8.7 percent of wage income is put into an individual account  22
with the government that earns a 4 percent real return.  Upon retirement, savings in this 
account are annuitized.  Effectively, people have the option to have their tax rate on labor 
reduced from 40 percent to 31.3 percent and to save 8.7 percent of their labor income in a 
government retirement account or to continue with the current social security system. With 
the reform, non–social security transfers are left unchanged. 
 
Table 6 
Government Social Security Liabilities Relative to GNI 
and the Capital/Output Ratio Subsequent to Reform 
Period 
GNI





    
1 2.30  2.71 
15 1.57  2.80 
30 0.63  3.08 
45 0.00  3.31 
60 0.00  3.32 
 
  Steady-state social security liabilities with the pay-as-you-go system are large: 4.62 
times gross national income (GNI).  With the reform, those aged 37 and younger choose the 
new system.  The welfare gain to the 22-year-old at the time of the change exceeds 4 percent 
in lifetime consumption equivalents.  Associated with the change, the capital/annual-output 
ratio increases from 2.7 to 3.3, as seen in Table 6. This increase takes 45 years.  23
Table 6 shows that pension liabilities of the pay-as-you-go system are large, being 
2.30 times GDP.  With the new system, the decline steadily and becomes zero 35 years after 
the reform. 
Some equity considerations 
  In the model world all individuals earn the same wage when, in fact, some people 
earn higher wages than others.  Given that earning a 4 percent after-tax real return is an 
attractive investment, equity considerations suggest an upper bound on contributions.  
Similarly, lower income households should have the right to contribute more than 8.7 percent 
of their labor income. 
  Still another consideration is how to deal with married couples.  An equitable solution 
is that each party has an account and household contributions are split equally between the 
two accounts with the contribution limit discussed above applying to an individual account 
and not to a household account. There will be some who are so unfortunate that the amount 
in their account will be insufficient to provide for a minimal acceptable retirement.  This 
suggests adding means-tested supplementary benefits. 
  Some may ask, why force people to save, as this scheme does.  The answer is that it 
gets around the time inconsistency problem.  Some individuals will not save if they know 
that others will provide for their consumption whether the others are taxpayers, family 
members, or charities. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
  In this study, in the process of determining the effect of differences in effective 
marginal labor tax rates on labor supply across countries and time in the advanced industrial 
countries, I have estimated the elasticity of labor supply and have found it to be large, nearly  24
3 when the fraction of time allocated to market is in the neighborhood of the current U.S. 
level. This estimate of the elasticity is essentially the same one that is needed to account for 
business cycle fluctuations.   That this elasticity is large is good news.  If labor supply were 
inelastic, the advanced industrial countries would face a cruel choice of either increasing 
taxes on the young, thereby lowering young people’s welfare, or not honoring the promises 
made to the old, making the old worse off.   
The high labor supply elasticity does mean that as populations age, promises of 
payments to the current and future old cannot be financed by increasing tax rates.  These 
promises can be honored by reducing the effective marginal tax rate on labor income and 
moving toward retirement systems with the property that benefits on margin increase 
proportionally to contributions.  Requiring people to save for their retirement years is not a 
tax and does not reduce labor supply.  As the illustrative example establishes, such a system 
benefits the currently young workers and future workers while honoring promises made to 
the old. 
  One factor that I ignored in my social security reform example was that a larger 
capital/labor ratio increases the wages with any reasonably aggregate production function.  If 
this factor is taken into consideration, the welfare gains are bigger.  It is beyond the scope of 
this lecture to more than scratch the surface of how best to reform the social security 
retirement system and what the resulting welfare gains would be.  But it is clear, given the 
high responsiveness of labor supply to marginal labor tax rates, that the potential gains are 
great.  25
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Data Appendix 
1.   Source of National Account statistics: United Nations (1982, 2000) 
2.   Source of civilian employment, noncivilian employment, annual hours per employee,  
      population aged 15-64: OECD Labor Database, Labor Market Statistics – 
      http:www1.oecd.scripts/cde/viewsubj.asp?SUBJNAME=labor&SUBJNAME_E=Labour 
Note: “Hours of work: manufacturing” data were used for Japan in 1970–71 because annual 
hours per employee for Japan in 1970–71 were not in the OECD Labor Database. These data 
were obtained from United Nations (1981).  These are based on establishment study. 




4.   Source of income taxes and contributions for social security, United States: BEA table 
3.2. – http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=Y#S3 
5.   Source of National Account statistics for Spain: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spain 
Statistical Office) – http://www.ine.es/inebase/menu3i.htm#15 
    Download of the annual national accounts for the period 1993–2001. 
 